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JURISPRUDENCE. By David B.
Wexler and Bruce J. Winick. North Carolina: Carolina
Academic Press (1992). 336 Pp. $34.95.
ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC

Reviewed by Kathryn Kelly*

Mental health law, like other "modem" areas of the law, traces its origin
to a list of exceptions in other areas of the law. For example, in the area of
tort law there are many older cases addressing the responsibility of those
suffering from mental illness for their intentional' and negligent 2 torts and
the capacity of such persons to give informed consent to medical treatment. 3
In the field of criminal law, there are many cases defining and applying the
insanity defense. The field of mental health law came to be recognized as
separate and distinct during the last two decades as the law's attitude toward
persons with mental disabilities evolved from one of paternalism, doing what
is in the "best interest" of the individual, to one of protection of civil rights,
guaranteeing a hearing before confinement. This evolution resulted in a
flood of new cases.4 Many of these rights were first recognized in other areas
of the law and were then imported into mental health law. 5 This "rightsbased" analysis frequently finds the rights of the mentally disabled person
battling for primacy with the rights of others.6 The rights-based focus is also
subject to changes in judicial and popular attitudes concerning entitlement
* Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
1. See, e.g., McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1937) (holding "insane person"
liable for the intentional torts of assault and battery where defendant struck attendant over the
head with a leg of furniture). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 135, at 1072 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing common law doctrine that

insanity is not a defense for intentional tort).
2. See, e.g., Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970) (holding
the defendant, who suffered from an "insane delusion" that her car could fly, to the same
reasonable person standard applicable to all defendants involved in automobile accidents).
3. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 18, at 114 (discussing common law doctrine of capacity to give consent).
4. See DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 4 (1991) (providing examples of traditional doctrinal development).

5. Professor Wexler provides many examples of rights developed in the area of criminal
procedure and extended to civil commitment cases of the mentally disabled. Id. at 4-5.
6. For example, the right of the community to be safe may compete with the individual's
right to a hearing before being involuntarily confined.
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to rights.7 Professor Wexler fears that such a focus on constitutional rights,
if it becomes the exclusive approach to mental health law or even the dominant one, will cause stagnation in this area of the law as it already has affected criminal procedure, which is similarly derivative of constitutional
law.'
Into this rights-based agenda, Professor Wexler proposes to insert a therapeutic focus to the law of mental health. Professor Wexler defines therapeutic jurisprudence as the study of how substantive rules, legal procedures, and
the roles of lawyers and judges produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. 9 In other words, does the law assist the individual in achieving
mental health? Professor Wexler's thesis is that such an inquiry not only
will rejuvenate mental health law, saving it from the vagaries of popular
rights-based law, but also will provide additional benefits to society.
Those societal benefits are derived from several sources. First, and perhaps most obvious, the medical treatment of individual patients would be
enhanced, with a concomitant increase in its success rate, thus allowing the
law to play the role of healer. Second, a benefit is derived from the interdisciplinary nature of the inquiry. As the science of psychology advances its
understanding of mental illness, its causes, and its treatment, the law is enriched by that better understanding. Without this interdisciplinary approach, there is a danger that the rights-based focus of the law would allow
the law to proceed on a track uninformed by the underlying psychology.10
Finally, weaning mental health law away from its dependence on constitutional issues makes it more open to international and comparative law approaches than is possible under the current focus on the United States
Constitution as the source of law.
In 1987, Professor Wexler prepared a paper on law and therapy for a
workshop sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health that established this theme of therapeutic jurisprudence as a preferred approach to
mental health law." That paper then became the introductory chapter in
7. Professor Wexler uses the example of the change in popular and judicial attitudes
toward standards for confinement of insanity acquitees after the John Hinkley verdict. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 6-7.
9. The task of therapeutic jurisprudence is to identify-and ultimately to examine empirically-relationships between legal arrangements and therapeutic outcomes." Id. at 8; see also
DAVID

B.

WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:

THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT

(1990).

10. See Robert F. Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due
Care: Psychotherapistsand Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, 17 J. Psychiatry & L. 163
(1989), reprinted in WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 4, at 157-83 (warning that a crystallized
standard of liability for medical malpractice may cause the law to be less responsive to advances in diagnosis and treatment in the field of mental health).
11. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 4, at 9.
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his 1990 anthology of articles entitled Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law
as a Therapeutic Agent.12 Professor Winick, who also has authored articles
using the therapeutic jurisprudence approach, shares this interest in looking
at the law through the eyes of the healer.13 Professors Wexler and Winick,
through their collection in Essays in TherapeuticJurisprudence,play out the
theme developed by them in their previous articles and books by applying
their therapeutic jurisprudence thesis to several representative areas of
mental health law.
Because I am principally interested in the interface between mental health
law and tort law, I was particularly intrigued by Professor Wexler's use of
the issue of liability of mental health care providers for failure to warn the
potential victims of their patients as an example of the therapeutic jurisprudence approach. Through the now famous case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the
Universityof California, 4 the California Supreme Court recognized the duty
of a therapist to warn potential victims of violent threats made against them
by patients during therapy.' 5 The case was controversial and stimulated
both legal scholarship 16 and public dialogue. The debate focused on the tension between the rights of the patient to therapy enhanced by the patient's
trust in the therapist's discretion and the rights of the potential victim to
personal safety enhanced by a warning.
Professor Wexler brings his therapeutic approach to this principle of tort
12.

WEXLER, supra note 9, at 9.

13. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 769; see also Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet:
Wagering with the Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 737 (1991). The Introduction describes the development of their shared interest. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 4, at ix-x.
14. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
15. The case involved a patient under the care of a psychologist employed by the University of California. During the course of treatment, the psychologist learned that the patient was
obsessed with Tatiana Tarasoff and intended to kill her. The psychologist told the campus
police of the threat. The police briefly detained the patient, but subsequently released him
after deciding he was rational and admonishing him to stay away from Ms. Tarasoff. Neither
the campus police nor the psychologist warned Ms. Tarasoff or her family. Two months later,
the patient killed Ms. Tarasoff. Her parents filed wrongful death cases alleging, inter alia, that
the psychologist had a duty to warn Ms. Tarasoff or her family of the patient's threat. Id. at
339-41.
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Crocker, Judicial Expansion of the TarasoffDoctrine: Doctors'
Dilemma, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 83 (1985) (arguing that Tarasoff established a legal duty
upon psychotherapists which permits a breach of the patient's confidence in certain circumstances); Mark T. Dykstra, Duty to Warn of Potentially Dangerous Patients, 29 RES GESTAE
461 (1986); Thomas A. Goodman, From Tarasoff to Hopper: The Evolution of the Therapist's
Duty to Protect Third Parties,3 BEHAV. Sc1. & L. 195 (1985); Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality
and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasofffor Psychiatristsand Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263 (1982).
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law by asking whether there might actually be a therapeutic benefit to the
law's imposition of the duty to warn the victim. He notes that "homicidal
threats are overwhelmingly made against intimates who themselves play a
substantial role in contributing to the violence."' 7 He then suggests that it is
possible that encouraging a therapist to contact the potential victim not only
will meet the law's stated goal of protecting the victim but also will benefit
the patient if the therapist is able to involve the potential victim in "conjoint" therapy."8 If this is true, the apparent conflict between the patient's
right to a confidential relationship and the potential victim's right to a warning is revealed as a false dichotomy. Thus, much of the legal system's time
and energy that is expended in balancing those "rights" is wasted.
Of course, before Professor Wexler's hypothesis can be proven, it has to be
supported by empirical studies in the field of psychology. 9 Therein lies another article. This aspect of therapeutic justice-that it is subject to empirical, interdisciplinary investigation-is one of its most attractive features.
Having urged therapeutic effect as something that should be considered in
the formation of legal doctrine, Professors Wexler and Winick turn their
attention to how both legal and psychological scholarship need to develop in
order to provide the necessary data for the courts to consider. In doing so,
the authors have set an ambitious research agenda to carry mental health
scholars into the next decade. 2 °
As is apparent, I was intrigued by the thesis of therapeutic jurisprudence
that the authors develop in the first two chapters of the book. The next
seven chapters 2 ' apply the theory to particular circumstances. Then there
are chapters proposing a research agenda and exploring the use of therapeutic jurisprudence to teach law students about the interaction between law
and the behavioral sciences. The book is a coherent piece that is more satisfying to the reader than Professor Wexler's earlier collection of previously
published essays on this topic, 22 which was introduced by a less well-devel-

oped explanation of their common theme.23
17. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 4, at 10.
18. Id. at 10-11 (citing David B. Wexler, Patients, Therapists, and Third Parties: The Victimological Virtues of Tarasoff, 2 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1 (1979), reprinted in WEXLER,

supra note 9, at 201).
19. As the authors point out, "[I]egal judgments.., are often based on factual predicates
that remain unexamined empirically and that might turn out not to be true ....
" WEXLER &
WINICK, supra note 4, at xi.
20. Id. at 303-20. See also David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
as a New Approach to Mental Health Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979
(1991).
21. Each chapter is a separate, previously published article.
22. WEXLER, supra note 9.
23. See John W. Parry, Psychological Treatment and Justice at Odds, 15 MENTAL &
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The authors recognize that in a particular case the therapeutic values may
conflict with competing values of patient autonomy or community safety
and thus might have to be sacrificed or at least compromised.2 4 Yet, Professor Wexler maintains a world view of harmony between therapeutic and
other aims, to see not conflict but balance in the potentially competing demands society places on the law. It will be interesting to see if this proves to
be true. I look forward to reading the articles of those who take up the
challenge of the research agenda issued as the concluding chapter of the
book.

PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 119, 123 (1991) (reviewing DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990)) (recommending that the In-

troduction's explanation of the thesis of therapeutic jurisprudence be expanded, and suggesting
that the book not be purchased for the accompanying articles alone because they are available
from other sources).
24. "Let us, at the outset, emphasize that therapeutic jurisprudence does not embrace a
vision of law or even of mental health law as serving exclusively or primarily therapeutic ends
.... The law serves many ends, and our suggestion that the impact on therapeutic values of
legal rules and practices should be analyzed does not mean that therapeutic values should
predominate over others." WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 4, at xi.

